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Abstract
Several authors in bioethics literature have expressed the view that a whole brain 
conception of death is philosophically indefensible. If they are right, what are the 
alternatives? Some authors have suggested that we should go back to the old cardio-
pulmonary criterion of death and abandon the so-called Dead Donor Rule. Others 
argue for a pluralist solution. For example, Robert Veatch has defended a view that 
competent persons should be free to decide which criterion of death should be used 
to determine their death. However, there is very little data on people’s preferences 
about death determination criteria. We conducted online vignette-based survey with 
Latvian participants (N = 1416). The data suggest that the pluralist solution fits best 
with the way our study participants think about death determination—widely dif-
fering preferences concerning death determination criteria were observed. Namely, 
most participants choose one of the three criteria discussed in the literature: whole 
brain, higher brain, and cardiopulmonary. Interestingly, our data also indicate that 
study participants tend to prefer less restrictive criteria for determination of their 
own deaths than for determination of deaths of their closest relatives. Finally, the 
preferences observed in our sample are largely in accord with the Dead Donor Rule 
for organ procurement for transplantation.
Keywords Death · Death determination · Brain death · Organ transplantation
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s4059 
2-020-00114 -0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Ivars Neiders 
 ivars.neiders@rsu.lv
1 Department of Humanities, Rīga Stradiņš University, Dzirciema 16, Riga LV 1007, Latvia
2 Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Kaunas University of Technology, Kaunas, 
Lithuania
36 I. Neiders, V. Dranseika 
1 3
1 Introduction
Brain death is legally accepted as the criterion of death in many countries world-
wide.1 Despite this wide consensus there are still many pockets of resistance in 
philosophy and in the medical community, and one might even argue, that there 
are even more dissenters now than there were about 20 or 30  years ago, when 
brain death started its way towards its legal recognition. Many philosophers have 
expressed the view that the concept of brain death is philosophically indefensible 
and therefore should be abandoned (Veatch 1993; Singer 1995; Truog 1997; Degra-
zia 2005). Peter Singer, for example, has pointed out that brain death is a conven-
tional fiction and that although currently there is consensus about the concept, for 
various reasons it is unstable (1995, pp. 35–37).2 Seema Shah, Robert Truog and 
Franklin Miller have argued that death determination based on whole brain death 
is an “unacknowledged legal fiction that is used without full recognition of its fal-
sity” (Shah et al. 2011, p. 721).3 This, however, raises difficult questions about the 
possibility of effective organ procurement and transplantation policy as the current 
practices in this area in many countries rely on the acceptance of the brain death 
criterion of death.
Several authors have come up with alternative suggestions about what should be 
done in this situation. Some authors (e. g. McMahan 2002; Glannon 2007) argue 
that instead of the whole brain death criterion we should accept the so-called higher 
brain criterion of death, i.e. assume that death should be determined as soon as irre-
versible loss of consciousness is diagnosed. Others argue for a slightly more com-
plex solution. For example, Robert Truog (1997) suggests that we should return 
to the good old cardiorespiratory criterion of death and uncouple the link between 
organ transplantation and death.4 This means abandoning the so-called Dead Donor 
Rule—the principle that vital organs can be procured only from donors who are 
dead. The purpose of this move is to keep the current practice of organ procurement 
for transplantation, which we would have to change if we would simply go back to 
the cardiopulmonary concept of death without challenging the Dead Donor Rule.5
Furthermore, there are authors who argue that there is no reasonable hope to 
arrive at a consensus on the issue of death determination, because people have 
1 Although the criterion is widely accepted, diagnostic criteria that are used in different countries to 
detect brain death might differ. For further discussion see Wijdicks (2002).
2 In a similar vein Jeff McMahan has described brain death as an “an unstable compromise between 
those views that make the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness the criterion of human death 
and those that insist that the death of a human being, like the death of any other organism, consists in the 
irreversible loss of functional integrity by the organism” (McMahan, 1995, pp. 96–97).
3 See also Shah (2018) and Younger (1992).
4 This position is developed further and defended in (Miller and Truog 2012).
5 To be more precise, it should be noted that currently in considerable number of cases of transplanta-
tion organs are procured from individuals who fulfil the traditional criterion for death determination, i.e., 
from donors after circulatory death (DCD). For example, according to the latest report published by the 
EDQM in 2018, in the European Union there have been 11,325 actual deceased donors and 1785 of them 
were DCDs (Dominiguez-Gil, 2019, p. 19). We would like to thank David Rodriguez-Arias for bringing 
this to our attention.
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rather different intuitions about the matter and all philosophical conceptions 
advanced so far have problems of their own. Those authors defend the view, that 
determination of death is not a matter that can be decided by some medical facts 
about human organisms, but rather that it is a metaphysical and ethical choice, 
a decision that usually depends on the extent to which particular medical facts 
matter to people. Therefore, the only workable solution is to embrace pluralism 
about the criteria of death and to admit that people themselves should be allowed 
to choose the criteria that are used to determine their deaths. Views along these 
lines have been proposed by several authors (e. g. Lachs 1988; Sass 1992; Ema-
nuel 1995; Bagheri 2007; Zeiler 2009), but to our knowledge the most elabo-
rate account of this kind belongs to Robert Veatch (1989, 1999, 2019), Veatch 
and Ross (2016). According to Veatch, we have to tolerate different views that 
people have about death and to allow different groups to act on their opinions. 
Veatch proposes that people—while still competent—should be free within rea-
son to choose the criteria under which they should be considered dead. As there 
are indefinite number of theoretically possible conceptions of death, there should 
be—for practical reasons—some limited set of choice alternatives. Veatch sug-
gests that people should be offered to choose from the three plausible accounts 
that are discussed in bioethics literature, i.e., cardiopulmonary, whole-brain and 
higher brain. Furthermore, since for different reasons not everyone will make an 
explicit choice among the offered criteria of death, there must be a default posi-
tion on death, so that it is clear for doctors and others how to proceed in such 
cases. Veatch proposes that the best candidate for that role is the currently widely 
accepted whole-brain conception. In cases where patients have not made their 
view on death clear while competent, the decision within certain limits should be 
made by the next of kin as it is done in other similar situations already.
Notwithstanding how the philosophical debate on this topic will unfold, the prac-
ticability of different suggestions should also be addressed. Prima facie, proposals 
that diverge less from popular preferences have a better chance of being successfully 
implemented as policies and the nature and distribution of these preferences is an 
empirical matter. Furthermore, some of philosophical theories in the market (e.g. 
pluralistic policy advocated by Veatch) imply that public preferences have a role in 
shaping the implementation of a given policy.
One thing to note is that there seems to be much public misunderstanding about 
medical and legal facts concerning death determination. A recent literature review 
indicates that “the existing data on public attitudes regarding brain death and organ 
transplantation reflect substantial public confusion” about medical and legal facts 
(Shah et al. 2015, p. 291). There are some important tendencies noted in the empiri-
cal literature, however. For example, research conducted in Japan and China (see 
Yang and Miller 2015, p. 216 for a brief overview) indicates a quite strongly pro-
nounced support for a cardiopulmonary understanding of death. However, as far as 
we know, there are no studies in which participants had a possibility to explicitly 
indicate their own preferences concerning death determination criteria by choosing 
from a wide set of options. Another tendency of note is rather consistent public sup-
port for the Dead Donor Rule (see Dubois and Anderson 2006 for a review; but see 
Nair-Collins et al. 2014).
38 I. Neiders, V. Dranseika 
1 3
In this paper, we intend to contribute to this emerging literature on public prefer-
ences concerning death determination. There were three aims of the study. First, we 
wanted to gather some preliminary data on preferences concerning death determina-
tion criteria. We wanted to learn whether some potential criteria are more likely to 
be preferred than others. Second, we wanted to learn whether these preferences dif-
fer when we make the judgement about which criteria should be applied to ourselves 
and to our closest relatives. Third, we wanted to learn whether these preferences 
accord well with the Dead Donor Rule.
2  Study
2.1  Participants
The study questionnaire in Latvian was distributed via social networks Twitter and 
Facebook with a short request to complete the survey and share the link on their 
social network profiles. Within 3 days through which it was live, 1491 Latvian par-
ticipants took part in it. After removing 3 participants for indicating age lower than 
18 years old and another 72 participants for not providing answers to at least one 
of the four main measures, N = 1416 (67% females, 32% males, 1% chose ‘other/
prefer not to answer’, 3 participants did not provide any answer; mean age: 35.1; 
 SDage = 10.0; age range 18–81, 38 participants (2.7%) did not indicate their age).
2.2  Materials and procedure
To conduct the study, we developed a description of a process of dying. The descrip-
tion was developed in English and checked for medical accuracy by a medical 
doctor. Then the materials were translated into Latvian by one of the authors and 
checked for readability by a professional editor.
After receiving information on the nature of the study and providing their con-
sent, participants read the following possible description of the process of dying, 
divided into numbered stages, from stages of increasing health deterioration (Stages 
1 and 2) to a description of a corpse that already starts to decay (Stage 6). The 
remaining stages were designed to mimic conceptions of death discussed in bioeth-
ics literature. Stage 3 was designed to reflect the higher brain criterion of death, 
Stage 4—whole brain death criterion, Stage 5—cardiopulmonary criterion. This 
6-stage description was always available for participants at the bottom of each page 
with measure.
(1) The patient had fever and headaches for 3 days. The patient cannot tolerate 
bright light and noises. The patient is nauseous, and when he moves too fast he 
has vertigo. The doctor stuck a needle into the patient’s back to get some of the 
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(2) The patient has been in the hospital for 3 days. First, in Neurology unit, but after 
a day he was transferred to the Intensive care unit. Patient’s memories of the 
recent past are fragmented, he has intense hallucinations. Medication is used to 
calm him down. In the ICU he is asleep most of the time. When he opens his eyes 
he cannot recognize the relatives. Sometimes when awake he mumbles random 
words or screams.
(3) The patient’s state deteriorated rapidly. His brain herniated. Due to that the cer-
ebral cortex of the brain stopped functioning. The patient is still breathing on his 
own and his heart beats, but he cannot feel anything or make himself move. The 
consciousness is irrevocably lost. The patient does not react to any attempts to 
talk to him. However, the patient responds to some stimuli: when the neurolo-
gist poured some ice-cold water into the patient’s ears and looked for his eyes to 
move, they did move. The patient is in this state for 2 weeks.
(4) The patient’s brain stopped functioning. The patient is intubated and breathing is 
done by mechanical lung ventilator. If removed from it, the patient would not be 
able to breathe. The heart is beating, but medication is needed to sustain it. The 
patient does not move and does not feel anything. The patient no longer reacts 
to painful stimuli but some very basic reflexes remain: when the neurologist hits 
the knee with a little rubber hammer, the leg moves. The patient is in this state 
for 2 weeks.
(5) The patient’s heart stopped and the patient was disconnected from the ventilator. 
The patient is not breathing, the body temperature starts to drop below 36 °C. 
The skin is becoming cold and grey. The patient is not responsive to any stimuli 
whatsoever.
(6) After a day, the body is cold and stiff. The temperature is the same as the room 
temperature. The blood in blood vessels has pooled in the lower parts of the body 
due to gravity. The abdomen is distended because guts are starting to decay due 
to bacteria in there.
On the next page some additional background information was provided in 
order to make the study task more intelligible to the participants.
In different countries of the world, different criteria for the determination of 
death are used. For example, in some countries, death is declared after full 
brain death, while in others—when the heart no longer beats. In some coun-
tries, people have a right to choose, what criterion will be applied to them 
or to their relatives.
The following two pages contained questions on preferences for death deter-
mination. One concerning the self and the other concerning a close relative. The 
order of presentation of these two pages was randomized and participants were 
not allowed to come back to the previous page to change their responses. For both 
questions, participants had to choose a stage as numbered in the description of 
the process of dying.
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The question about the self read:
Try to think about your own preferences concerning your death. Suppose that 
you also can end up in a situation that resembles the one described. (If you 
want to refresh your memory, description of the process of dying is repeated 
at the bottom of this page.) Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at 
which you would you prefer your own death to be stated.
While the question about the relative read:
Try to think about your preferences concerning the death of your closest rel-
atives. Suppose that a close relative of yours can end up in a situation that 
resembles the one described. (If you want to refresh your memory, description 
of the process of dying is repeated at the bottom of this page.) Please indicate 
the stage of the process of dying at which you would prefer the death of your 
relative to be stated.
After answering questions about death determination, some additional back-
ground was provided on the next page concerning organ procurement for donation.
The time at which death is determined is also very important in the context of 
organ donation, since organs are suitable for transplantation only when they 
are not damaged. Most frequently, organs are procured for donation after com-
plete death of the brain (Stage 4 in the description of the process of dying), but 
sometimes medical professionals wait till the heart stops beating (Stage 5), but 
in such cases it is necessary to procure the organs no later than five minutes 
after the heart stops beating.
The next two pages contained questions on preferences for organ procurement. 
One concerning the self and the other concerning a close relative. The order of pres-
entation of these two pages was randomized and participants were not allowed to 
come back to the previous page to change their responses.
The question about the self read:
Try to think about your own preferences concerning organ donation. Suppose 
that you also can end up in a situation that resembles the one described. (If you 
want to refresh your memory, description of the process of dying is repeated 
at the bottom of this page.) Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at 
which you would prefer your organs to be procured for transplantation.
While the question about the relative read:
Suppose that a close relative of yours can end up in a situation that resembles 
the one described. (If you want to refresh your memory, description of the pro-
cess of dying is repeated at the bottom of this page.) Please also suppose that 
your close relative expressed a wish to become an organ donor after they die. 
Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at which you would prefer the 
organs of your close relative to be procured for transplantation.
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For both questions, participants had to choose a stage as numbered in the descrip-
tion of the process of dying. They were also allowed to choose additional option “I 
would not agree to organ donation in such case”.
Participants then provided information on their gender and age as well as whether 
they have studied philosophy and how often they practice religion and were thanked 
for participation.
The study logic is depicted in Fig.  1. Full study materials in both English and 
Latvian as well as study data and additional analyses can be found online: https ://
osf.io/zadqv . 
3  Results
Since our measures asked to indicate a stage in the process of dying, we treat these 
responses as answers on ordinal scale, and thus run non-parametric tests.
3.1  Death determination, the main analysis
Mann–Whitney U test was performed in order to test for order effects. No dif-
ferences in ranks were observed in either responses to the first person scenario 
(U = 250,121.0, Z = 0.068, p = 0.946, r = 0.00) or scenario about the relative 
(U = 242,333.5, Z = 1.149, p = 0.251, r = 0.03). Thus, all participants were pooled for 
related samples analysis.
Summary results about preferences concerning death determination criteria are 
displayed in Table 1.
In both cases, top-3 most frequently chosen stages were 3, 4, and 5, with 4 being 
the most frequent (38.4% in first-person question and 43.5% in relative question).
Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that participants were more often will-
ing to choose a later stage for relatives than for themselves, Z = 17.74, p < 0.001, 
PSdep = 0.32. Looking in more detail, out of 1416 participants, 453 (32%) chose a 
later stage for determination of the relative’s death than their own death while 
only 41 (3%) chose an earlier stage for themselves. The remaining 922 (65%) pre-
ferred the same stage in both cases. Here and later in the paper we use probability 
of superiority estimation for dependent groups (PSdep) as a measure of effect size 
for Wilcoxon Signed-ranks tests, as recommended by Grissom and Kim (2014, pp. 
114–115). PSdep = 0.32 means that there is 32% probability that within a randomly 
sampled pair of responses, the score for the relative will be higher than the score for 
oneself. These results are presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1  Study logic
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3.2  Additional analyses
For subsequent analyses that involve decisions concerning transplantation, 115 (8%) 
participants were removed since they chose “I would not agree to organ donation in 
such case” as an answer to at least one transplantation question (43 were opposed in 
first-person case; 21—in relative case; 51—in both). The reason for their exclusion 
is that leaving them in would not allow us to treat answers as choices on ordinal 
scale anymore.6
Information on choices indicated by the remaining participants (N = 1301) is pre-
sented in Table 2.
In all four cases, top 3 most frequently chosen stages were 3, 4, and 5, with 4 
(whole brain death) being the most frequent (39.1% in first-person question, 44.9% 
in relative question, 59.2% in transplantation first-person case and 62.3% in trans-
plantation relative case).
Table 1  Preferences of 
participants concerning stages 
of the dying process in which 
their death and death of their 
relatives should be stated 
(N = 1416)
n indicates the number of participants choosing a given stage and % 
indicates the percent of participants choosing a given stage. Percent-
ages may not add up to 100 due to rounding,
Stages First-person Relative
n % n %
1 9 0.6 7 0.5
2 45 3.2 15 1.1
3 507 35.8 280 19.8
4 544 38.4 616 43.5
5 263 18.6 448 31.6
6 48 3.4 50 3.5
Fig. 2  Proportion of participants who prefer earlier stage for determination of death for themselves than 
for their relatives, same stage for both, and earlier stage for the relatives than for themselves. N = 1416
6 Results concerning death determination preferences were nearly identical to those achieved in the full 
sample before 115 participants were removed. Analysis is presented in online Supplementary materials.
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3.2.1  Transplantation
Out of 1301 participants, 281 (22%) chose a later stage for harvesting a rela-
tive’s organs than their own while only 31 (2%) chose a later stage for them-
selves. Remaining 989 (76%) preferred the same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks test indicated that participants were more often willing to choose 
a later stage for relatives than for themselves, Z = 13.61, p < 0.001, PSdep = 0.22. 
These results are presented in Fig. 3.
3.2.2  First‑person case
Out of 1301 participants, 323 (25%) chose a later stage for harvesting their organs 
than for their death determination while 159 (12%) chose an earlier stage for har-
vesting their organs than for their death determination. The remaining 819 (63%) 
preferred the same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test showed 
that participants were more often willing to choose a later stage for organ pro-
curement than for death determination, Z = 7.61, p < 0.001, PSdep = 0.25.
Table 2  Preferences of 
participants concerning stages 
of dying process in which their 
death and death of their relatives 
should be stated and in which 
their and their relatives’ organs 
can be taken for transplantation 
(N = 1301)
n indicates the number of participants choosing a given stage and % 
indicates the percent of participants choosing a given stage. Percent-
ages may not add up to 100 due to rounding
Stages Death determination Procurement
First-person Relative First-person Relative
n % n % n % n %
1 8 0.6 6 0.5 3 0.2 3 0.2
2 40 3.1 13 1.0 20 1.5 9 0.9
3 484 37.2 263 20.2 281 21.6 143 11.0
4 509 39.1 584 44.9 770 59.2 811 62.3
5 227 17.4 400 30.7 217 16.7 326 25.1
6 33 2.5 35 2.7 10 0.8 9 0.7
Fig. 3  Proportion of participants who prefer earlier stage for harvesting organs for transplantation for 
themselves than for their relatives, same stage for both, and earlier stage for the relatives than for them-
selves. N = 1301
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3.2.3  Relative case
Out of 1301 participants, 239 (18%) chose a later stage for harvesting the organs of 
the relative than for death determination of the relative. 241 (19%) chose an earlier 
stage for organ procurement than for death determination. The remaining 821 (63%) 
preferred the same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that 
there was no difference in relative case between time of death determination and 
time of organ procurement, Z = 0.065, p < 0.948.
3.2.4  Demographic effects
There were no notable demographic effects. Only some weak associations between 
preferences and gender, religiosity and age were observed (all correlation coeffi-
cients smaller than 0.15). For the analysis of demographic effects see online Sup-
plementary materials.
4  Discussion
4.1  Preferences concerning death determination criteria
Looking at preferences for death determination, all three candidate criteria (cardio-
pulmonary; whole brain; higher brain) seem to have some support in our sample. 
The vast majority chose one of the three options that were designed to mimic death 
determination criteria familiar from the literature. This was true both for preferences 
concerning determination of their own death and for the death of their relatives. 
Stage 4 (whole brain death) was the most popular option for self (38.4%) and for 
relative (43.5%), but Stage 3 (higher brain death) was also a popular option (35.8% 
for self and 19,8% for relative). Stage 5 (cardiopulmonary death) was preferred by 
18.6% for self and 31.6% for relative. If we agree—along with Veatch—that the dis-
tribution of the preferences is a good guide to which options should be in the choice-
set while formulating a policy, then this result provides initial support for the idea 
of widening the set of criteria available for choice: not only whole brain death and 
cardiopulmonary death but also higher brain death should be in the choice-set.7 This 
is especially suggestive looking at preferences for the self where 40% of participants 
in our study opted for criteria that are less restrictive than the current legal standard 
(22% opted for more restrictive criteria).
7 In discussing preferences concerning policies of death determination, it is important to draw a distinc-
tion between two types of preferences. First, there are preferences about which criterion of death deter-
mination a person would prefer for herself or her relatives. Second, there are preferences about which 
criterion of death determination a person would prefer to be introduced as a general rule for the whole of 
society (or whether the person would prefer a pluralistic policy wherein people are left free to choose a 
criterion for themselves). In this paper, we look only into the first type of preferences.
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4.2  Differences between first‑person and relative cases
An interesting finding of the study is that participants tended to choose earlier stage 
in the process of dying for the determination of their own death than for the determi-
nation of death of their relative.
This has potential implications for situations in which relatives are entrusted to 
make a decision concerning which death determination criterion is to be applied: 
relatives may be inclined to choose a later stage for death determination than the 
patient herself would be inclined to choose, were she able to make a decision. This 
can be mitigated by encouraging people to write advance directives and putting 
more weight on them.
The same pattern was observed concerning the time at which organs are procured 
for transplantation. Participants tended to choose an earlier stage for themselves than 
for their relatives. This also can raise a similar concern in which relatives push for 
a later stage for organ procurement from their dying/dead relative than she herself 
would prefer, were she able to make a decision.
4.3  Dead Donor Rule
Concerning the Dead Donor Rule, the results are largely consistent with the rule: 
the vast majority of study participants prefer organs to be taken at the same stage at 
which death is declared or at a later stage. However, there also was a minority who 
exhibited a different pattern for themselves (12% of participants chose earlier stage 
for procurement of organs than for death determination) and also for the relatives 
(19%).
4.4  Limitations
Limitations of this study include the fact that participants were self-selected which 
prohibits us from drawing inferences about distribution of preferences in the whole 
Latvian population. Our data do not allow one to evaluate the precise distribution 
of preferences, but it is suggestive about general trends. Further research would 
be needed to provide more precise estimations. Another limitation is that only one 
description of the process of dying was used. Moreover, concerns can be raised that 
the process of death rarely if ever unfolds in the exact sequence of stages as in our 
description.8 Under realistic conditions we should not expect the process of dying 
to be structured in such a step-by-step manner. We acknowledge this as an impor-
tant limitation of our study but we would still like to defend this methodological 
move. While clearly an idealized abstraction, this experimental set-up was decided a 
priori since our main interest was to find a way to measure differences in how ‘per-
missive’ or ‘restrictive’ criteria of death determination and an acceptable time for 
organ procurement that study participants are willing to apply. While we sacrifice 
8 This concern was raised by an anonymous reviewer.
46 I. Neiders, V. Dranseika 
1 3
some realism in choosing to operate with sequential description of the process of 
dying and, in consequence, an ordinal scale, we also gain quite a bit in simplicity 
and intuitiveness of exposition. Treating the scale as categorical would remove these 
benefits. One more limitation is that in order to make the study more intelligible to 
the participants we introduced some explanations that referred to current practices 
which may have had some anchoring effects. Data reported in this paper accord very 
closely with the data from a much smaller (N  =  160) preliminary study we con-
ducted with Lithuanian participants (Dranseika and Neiders 2018).
5  Conclusions
In this paper, we present empirical data from Latvia on preferences concerning death 
determination criteria. Our data give preliminary evidence that there are pronounced 
differences in public preferences about death determination. All three conceptions of 
death discussed in the bioethics literature were preferred by a considerable propor-
tion of study participants. Moreover, our data also shows that the three conceptions 
of death that are suggested by Veatch as candidates for people to choose from are 
not entirely arbitrary—each had considerable number of supporters in our sample. 
In addition, since the whole brain criterion was the most frequently chosen answer, 
this would provide some preliminary evidence that—if default option is needed at 
all—this criterion would be most practicable as the default option. Also, as partici-
pants in most cases indicate that, provided that they have consented to donate their 
organs, the organs should be procured after their death is diagnosed, our data pro-
vide some support for the Dead Donor Rule, i.e., the data suggest that the rule fits 
well with the preferences observed in our sample. Last but not least, our study pro-
vides some evidence that people have a tendency to prefer an earlier stage for deter-
mination of death for themselves than for their relatives. This result underscores the 
importance of advance directives in establishing preferences concerning death deter-
mination criteria as the criterion preferred by a person might differ from the one that 
his or her relatives might choose, if that decision should be made when the person 
doesn’t have decision making capacity.
It might be objected, that from the evidence that people have certain beliefs there 
is no way to derive any normative conclusions about what kind of policies should 
be implemented. This is not the place to address this thorny issue as that would be 
a subject for another paper. However, if the question about the practicability of dif-
ferent proposals is addressed, then we think that our findings provide some initial 
evidence to support the pluralistic solution proposed by Veatch.9
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